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Abstract
Many papers have considered the problem of how to define forest. However, as we shall illustrate,
while most definitions capture some important aspects of what it means to be a forest, they almost
invariably omit or are very vague regarding other aspects. In the current paper we address this
issue, firstly by providing a definitional framework based on spatial and physical properties,
within which one can make explicit the implicit variability of the natural language forest concept
in terms of explicit parameters. Our framework explicitly differentiates between the functions
of classification, individuation and demarcation that comprise the interpretation of predicative
terms. Whereas ontologies have traditionally concentrated predominantly on classification, we
argue that in many cases (especially in the case of geographic concepts) criteria for individuation
(i.e. establishing how many distinct individual objects of a given type exist) and demarcation
(establishing the boundary of an object) require separate attention, involve their own particular
definitional issues and are affected by vagueness in different ways. We also describe a prototype
Prolog system that illustrates how our framework can be implemented.
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1 Introduction
There are many definitions of forest in the literature [29, 9]. While most of these capture
some important aspects of what it means to be a forest, they almost invariably omit or only
very loosely specify other important requirements. In particular, constraints on the overall
size, shape and topology of a forest are often omitted. In the current paper we address this
issue, firstly by providing a framework within which one can give formal definitions which
combine both spatial and physical properties; and secondly, by making explicit the implicit
variability of the natural language forest concept in terms of explicit parameters; and thirdly,
by differentiating between the functions of classification, individuation and demarcation
that comprise our interpretation of predicative terms. Whereas formal definitions have
traditionally concentrated predominantly on classification, we argue that in many cases
criteria for individuation (i.e. establishing how many distinct individual objects of a given type
exist) and demarcation (establishing the boundary of an object) require separate attention
and involve their own particular definitional issues, particularly in the domain of geographical
objects. In the current paper we propose the use of a supervaluation semantics, which we
suggest provides a natural and flexible framework within which to represent the wide variety
of different interpretations of the term ‘forest’.
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2 Defining ‘forest’
How much forest is there in the world? This is a surprisingly difficult question to answer
[1]. A broad range of forest concepts and definitions (more than 600 were reported in [29])
have been specified for different purposes, thereby leading to very different estimates [19].
Thus, it is not surprising that confusion arises over both global forest extent and its spatial
distribution [17, 18].
Traditionally, two main categories of forest definitions have been discussed in the literature:
land cover and land use [28]. While the former defines forest in terms of the ecological layer
and the physical characteristics of the land, the latter does it with regard to the purpose to
which the land is put to use by humans [32]. Definitions favouring one or another (or both)
approaches, together with other relevant features, are linked to different perspectives and
management objectives, the most relevant ones being: timber management, conservation of
ecosystems, increasing carbon stocks and landscape restoration [9]. For example, definitions
used for the analysis of carbon stocks generally focus on land cover, but ignore aspects
like connectedness or distinctions between natural or planted forests because they are not
relevant to describe the carbon potential. The opposite happens when defining forest for
landscape restoration purposes, where together with land use information, they become
crucial aspects to understand the effects on ecosystem services and forest-based livelihoods.
These differences are linked to scale and disciplinary compartmentalization and, besides
responding to the purpose for which the definitions were created [9], they pose limitations on
the construction of global knowledge [20] and data interoperability.
Moreover, beyond the semantic ambiguity of the concept itself, reflected in a wide variety
of specifications, most definitions of forest (and other geographic features), both in the
academic literature and in administrative regulations, are not precise [26, 34] which questions
consistency even within a particular research community or monitoring project. This limits
understanding of data and may impair management decisions or distort research findings.
Awareness of these issues exists and there is an extensive literature reporting it, both in
academia [7, 6, 29] and in policy [25, 14]. However, global agreement on the meaning of such
words has not been reached. Part of the community has focused on precisely defining forest
together with other natural resource terms. Other research has focused on examining the
reasons for definitional problems. Many papers have advocated accommodating a variety
of definitions [9] and pointed to consequent challenges, particularly for data integration
and multidisciplinary work [20]. The current investigation follows these lines and proposes
a framework that enables the coexistence, analysis and comparison of different precise
definitions of forest.
3 Forest definitions from a logical and ontological point of view
Concepts and definitions of forests and other geographical features have received wide
attention in the domain of Knowledge Representation, Geographical Information Science
and Philosophy, and the pervasive vagueness that affects them has been highlighted [13, 15].
In this section we first briefly discuss different aspects of vagueness. We then introduce
supervaluation semantics and discuss its ability to express the variety of possible meanings of
concepts, which will provide us with a flexible framework for implementing forest definitions.
Finally, we analyse how the research on ontology and, more specifically, on geographical
ontology, can contribute to the discussion on appropriate forest definitions, providing insight
into aspects of geographical features which are often overlooked on most characterisations.
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3.1 Vagueness and logics of vagueness for the study
The topic of vagueness has a long philosophical history, dating back nearly two and a half
thousand years [38]. Although not often explicitly mentioned in the literature, it is important
for our approach to make the distinction proposed in [5] between sorites vagueness and
conceptual vagueness:
Sorites1 vagueness occurs when the applicability of a predicate depends on specific
measurable parameters but their thresholds are undetermined, thus creating borderline cases.
For example, if we define forest as a large expanse densely populated by trees, there is no
exact specification of exactly how many trees it must contain. In fact, giving a precise
definition seems to be contrary to the way that the term ‘forest’ is used. It would seem very
odd to claim that a particular number of trees is insufficient to form a forest, whereas if
there were one more we would have a forest, as described by Fisher in [15].
Another kind of vagueness arises when there is a lack of clarity on which attributes
or conditions are essential to the meaning of a given term, so that it is controversial how
it should be defined. Thus, there is indeterminism regarding to which property or logical
combination of properties is relevant to determining whether a concept is applicable. We
call this conceptual vagueness. It is akin to ambiguity in that it occurs where a term
has multiple meanings that are qualitatively distinct, except that with ordinary ambiguity
the different meanings apply to completely different objects or situations, whereas with
conceptual vagueness there is considerable overlap between the sets of cases to which the
different meanings apply. This kind of vagueness underlies the controversy about whether to
define forest in terms of land cover or land use, and this case is a good illustration of the
overlapping of the applicability of the two interpretations, since the use to which land can be
put depends to a large extend on the material and ecological properties of its land cover.
In order to provide formalisations of vague predicates and vague concepts we follow the
lines of [3] by taking a supervaluationistic approach. Supervaluation semantics is based on the
idea that a vague language can be interpreted in many different precise ways, each of which
can be logically conceptualised in a precisification, which determines precise truth conditions
for each predicate of the language. By incorporating a set of many possible precisifications
into the semantics, a supervaluation model can accommodate major differences between
perspectives of multiple disciplines and management objectives as well as more minor
variations in the use of vague terms. Although the truth of propositions describing properties
of a situation will typically vary from precisification to precisification, there will be some
propositions that are true within the whole set of what are considered to be reasonable
(a.k.a. admissible) propositions. Such propositions may be called supertrue and constitute a
common consensus of accepted facts.
3.2 From an Ontological point of view
The value of ontologies in developing advanced information systems is now well established
[21]. A formal ontology can provide both a solid conceptual layer to clarify the forest
definitions and computational support for the integration of information coming from remote
sensing and traditional survey data. More importantly, it gives us a framework within which
we can systematically compare formal forest definitions and their spatial projections by
1 Referred to a puzzle known as The Heap: Would you describe a single grain of wheat as a heap? No.
Two grains? No. ... You must admit the presence of a heap sooner or later, so where do you draw the
line? (Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy).
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making implicit assumptions as explicit as possible.
One of the main advantages of ontologies is that they improve the interoperability of
the information systems that use them, acting to enforce a consensus view reached by
a community regarding a certain domain. By formalising the semantics of terminology,
ontologies provide a well defined framework for the interchange of information between
different systems. Moreover, logic-based ontologies support automated reasoning (the ability
to infer logical consequences) over the formal definitions and axioms of the domain. These
advantages have been reported for ontologies in information systems [31, 39] in general and
in GIS [16, 27] in particular.
In this paper we suggest that, by enriching a Forest Ontology with supervaluation
semantics, we provide the basis for a flexible, adaptive and unbiased representation of vague
terms, such as Forest or Tree. This brings the opportunity of moving from the need for a
(more or less) consensual and precise but artificial definition of a vague term like Forest to a
more realistic formalisation capturing a whole set of views coming from multiple disciplines
and stakeholders. This is, overall, a first step towards a framework explicitly supporting
the coexistence of different forest definitions within information systems. Moreover, the
use of supervaluation semantics, which largely preserves the inferential capabilities of first
order logic, should facilitate reasoning both within particular precise interpretations and
with regard to comparisons between different interpretations.
Moreover, in order to provide a sound characterisation of forests we can learn from
the literature on formal ontology in general and in the geographic domain in particular.
Given the complexity of the geographic space, its special characteristics [12] and the variety
of ‘things’ it can include [33, 36], much discussion has been raised when trying to answer
concisely the question of what is a geographic concept [35]. Some of the most interesting
characteristics pointed by ontologists and geographic information scientists include location,
topology, boundaries and mereology. It is surprising thus that when defining forest, little
attention has been paid to those aspects.
Among the most challenging issues affecting forest definitions are the following:
Existence of vague objects. There is an ongoing philosophical discussion on whether
the vagueness exhibited by geographic names and descriptions is merely linguistic or
ultimately ontological, that is, its terms are vague because they refer to vague objects,
objects with fuzzy boundaries [37]. Beyond the philosophical discussion, fuzzy and crisp
representations of forest have different uses both in academia and research.
The dichotomy of the object-field representations. In order to represent geographic
phenomena, ontologies have to encapsulate not only the meanings linked to specific
concepts but also the way these meanings are handled and represented [2]. Thus, a
precisification of a concept such as forest must embed information about its mode of
specification, typically either in terms of an object model or a field.
Scale and granularity. A conceptualization of geographic space may have several levels of
granularity, each of which will be appropriate for problem solving at different levels of
detail [13].
Endurants and perdurants. Endurants are entities that persist through time and are
regarded as wholly present at each moment of their existence (matter and objects), while
perdurants are never fully present at any one given moment in time, but instead ‘unfold’
themselves in successive phases or temporal parts (processes and events) [2]. Although
geographic entities are usually described as endurants, they may also be considered as
procesess. This is especially the case for forests, which undergo continual change, as trees
grow and die.
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Individuation criteria. How are entities such as mountains, rivers and forests individuated
within a landscape? Although the possession of a boundary is one mark of individuality,
in the geographical domain boundaries give rise to a number of ontological conundrums
and may themselves be difficult to individuate [8].
Topology, Mereology and Location. In the geographic space, topology is considered to
be first-class information, whereas metric properties, such as distances and shapes, are
used as refinements that are frequently less exactly captured [13]. A general theory of
spatial location is necessary to relate an entity with the spatial region that it occupies
and, finally, topology is crucial as mereology alone cannot account for some very basic
spatial relations, such as the relationship of continuity between two adjacent objects or
the relation of one thing being entirely inside or surrounding some other thing [8].
Identity over time. A simple model of composite objects as mathematical sets (where
sets are identical if and only if they have exactly the same elements) does not account for
more complex unity and identity criteria allowing one to accept the continued existence
of geographic objects even after the loss of or gain certain parts [8].
4 A framework for the formalisation of forest definitions
In order to provide a precise account of what a forest is, many aspects of its nature must
be specified. We propose a framework that compiles a collection of relevant features to
characterise a forest, which tries to unify different perspectives. The framework, shown in
Table 1, is by no means exhaustive.
Moreover, we divide these aspects into three main groups, using the notions of classification,
individuation and demarcation. We suggest that there are a large number of natural language
predicative words and phrases for which a reasonably clear distinction can be made between
some or all of these different aspects, and each has different ways of being made precise.
Thus, we review the general notion of individuality as it has been discussed in Philosophy,
complemented by the notions of identity and unity [22, 23] and by certain existential
conditions. We discuss the difference between individuation and classification, and how this
affects information modelling for in GIS and Forest monitoring. We propose a framework
that clearly differentiates these aspects and also distinguishes the aspect of demarcation,
which is particularly relevant for GIS. We suggest that the use of these notions as guiding
tools for building ontology-driven GIS can provide clarity on the ontological commitments
assumed in research and forest monitoring.
We finally show that in considering precisification of a vague predicate, these aspects are
often seperable, in that it may be possible to make one or two of the aspects precise without
committing to a precisification of the other aspects(s). For example we might individuate
and classify a forest entity without demarcating a precise boundary; or we might demarcate
a region of vegetation land cover without committing to whether it should be classified as a
forest. We argue that such distinctions are necessary to clarify the ontological commitment
made when using vague concepts in research.
5 Main purposes of forest definitions
The features included in the framework in Table 1 are grouped in three main categories,
namely classification, individuation and demarcation. These categories refer to three main
purposes of definition identified as particularly relevant for the field of naive geography.
Moreover, our understanding of classification and individuation match with the general
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Aspects of forest concept definitions
1. Classification
1.1. Qualitative characteristics (global
to the whole object)
A typical example would be the land use
1.2 Presence (or absence) of features E.g. roads, trees of more than 5m, shrubs, ...
1.3 Density, uniformity and scale of fea-
tures
Measures like the canopy cover should be meas-
ured not only in terms of the density but also the
uniformity and or scale, given that the predicate
can be applied to regions with different extensions.
1.4 Location restrictions Some definitions are contextualised in one area,
like tropical forest
2. Individuation
2.1 Morphological restrictions. Such as shape or minimal area
2.2 Metrical restrictions We may want to evaluate the proximity of con-
stituents
2.3 Topological restrictions Is the forest necessarily self-connected? Does the
forest have holes?
2.4 Mereological restrictions Is the forest the same forest (whole) if it loses one
part?
2.5 Rough location Part of the identity of the object is linked to its
geographical rough position
3. Demarcation
3.1 Fine grained threshold Determines the precise boundary of the forest
3.2 Fuzzy threshold? We may allow for fuzzy boundaries
Table 1 Compilation of forest definitions from different sources.
notions used to evaluate and validate ontologies suggested in [23], and the additional category
of demarcation is specific to the geographical domain of the current research.
5.1 Questions from a naive geographer
We consider three simple questions using the term forest and the different aspects of its
meaning to which they relate. These questions are used as guidelines to link cognitive
conceptualizations of the geographical space with relevant notions in the domain of philosophy
and ontology, as well as with actual research questions around the topic of global forest
monitoring.
(a) How much forest is there?
(b) How many forests are there in this region?
(c) What area is occupied by this forest?
Question (a) should be interpreted as How much forestland is there?, where the mass noun
‘forestland’ is typically interpreted in terms of a field conceptualisation of the geographical
space. A possible answer to that question can be found in [24], where the global land-area is
organised as a grid of land-pieces which are systematically classified in terms of the canopy
cover (it must be stressed that the classified entities in this case are not forests but land
parcels). A relevant precisification of ‘forest’ or ‘forestland’ for this study is exclusively
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concerned with fixing the characteristics that a piece of land needs to display in order to
satisfy this classification.
Question (b), however, requires the individuation of forests in order to be able to count
them, thus taking an object model approach. Characterising individuation criteria of objects
is hard and, as seen in Table 1, relies strongly on spatial (and also temporal) factors. As
we can see in [9], identity criteria are necessary in order to characterise forest for many
management objectives. For example, for landscape restoration purposes and conservation of
natural ecosystems, it is important to understand the dynamics of individual forests, and to
track whether they merge, split, appear or disappear, even if the global amount of forestland
is preserved.
Question (c) asks for the demarcation (or extension) of a forest. To give a precise answer,
appropriate thresholds and footprint algorithms need to be selected. Demarcation criteria is
particularly relevant for assessing forest loss and gain among others. It is often presumed
that forests need to be demarcated in order to answer question (b). However, as will be
shown in section 5.4, this need not necessarily be the case: we may be able to differentiate
(and hence count) forests, without fully establishing their exact boundaries.
The ability of an intelligent agent to interpret these questions and select the relevant
aspects of forest definitions, relies on a capacity to understand that geographic terms may
present different aspects of a complex multi-faceted semantics in different contexts. In other
words, it requires certain understanding of a naive geography.
5.2 Classification
Almost all predicates, and certainly all the notions of forest, incorporate some kind of
classification. In this paper we consider that an object x is classified under a predicate φ if it
satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions that govern φ’s applicability. This can be
formalised as
∀x[φ(x) → Φ(x)] and ∀x[Ψ(x) → φ(x)] (where φ does not occur in either Φ or Ψ).
Here we understand that the predicate φ does not carry identity or unity criteria on its
own. Rather, any object denoted by x to which φ may be applied is a member of a domain
of individuals that has already been fixed (either by direct stipulation of the domain or
by axioms involving other predicates). Following the nomenclature in [23] we express it as
φ-O-U. Moreover, classificational predicates are either semi-rigid -R or anti-rigid ∼R2.
Common examples of classification tasks in the geographic domain include both the
assignation of a category to an already individuated geographical object, such as classifying a
particular forest forest#23 into a forest type tropicalForest(forest#23 ) or a tree tree#5 into
its species oak(tree#5), and the assignation of a category to a portion of a mass term, typically
a certain region or land area landpiece#8, for example into f orestland(landpiece#8 ). The
latter, which focuses on the properties that characterise whether the concept foresthood is
applicable to a given land parcel, is certainly the one that has received more attention within
the Forestry literature. This kind of characterisation does not incorporate any specification
of individuality; and it seems this is not required to answer the naive question (a). It assumes
that an appropriate division of land into parcels has already been made (e.g. as raster cells)
2 The notion of rigidity is introduced in [23]: ‘A property is rigid if it is essential to all its possible
instances. There are also properties that are essential to some entities and not essential to others
(semi-rigid), and properties that are not essential to all their instances (anti-rigid)’
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Figure 1 Different land parcels (dashed lines) into forestland (FL) or otherland (OL) following
FAO’s requirement of a 10% of canopy cover.
and characterises ‘forest’ or ‘forestland’ as a mass term. Thus, the predicate is not concerned
with forest objects as such and does not provide a means to answer the question of how many
forests there are. Moreover, although φ can be used to determine the total area of forestland
over the entire domain under consideration, it does not determine the extension of individual
forests, and, in some cases, the total area of forestland will be different from the total area
of the forests contained, for example when some parcels of forestland are isolated from any
major forest.
5.2.1 Classificational characterisation of forests
In order to provide a background for any specification of the classification criteria for a
precisification of forestland, some basic characteristics are discussed below, especially those
relating to the points listed in Table 1.
Consider the task of classification applied over portions of the mass concept of land. In
the framework proposed in Table 1 we consider certain aspects of the classification that tend
to be overlooked even in attempts to provide concise definitions, such as [14]. Following the
framework, a precisification of forestland combines, first, (1.1) qualitative attributes, such as
the legal land use of the area. Then, (1.2) the presence of certain features, such as the trees
and the absence of other elements such as roads or buildings (these classificatory features
may of course make reference to other kinds of object or land cover defined in the ontology,
which in turn may be also subject to issues of vagueness and of finding an appropriate
individuation). Following, (1.3) the density, uniformity and scale of features. As illustrated
in Figure 1 and described below, differences in scale and uniformity may result in substantial
variations in the meaning of the categories. Finally, (1.4) some location restrictions (e.g. the
area must be within the tropics for tropical-forestland(x)) may be added in order to improve
contextual adaptation.
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Figure 1 shows some classifications of pieces of land in terms of their canopy cover, set to
the 10% as required in the FAO definition of forest [14]. Figures (a), (b) and (c) display the
same piece of land. (a) shows a common sense demarcation and, while (b) and (c) classify
that same land using a grid of the same size, both result in different information: (b) is fully
covered by ‘otherland’ (OL) while (c) is mostly covered by ‘forestland’ (FL). Similarly, two
pieces that greatly overlap can be classified as different land types, as in (f). A change in
scale such as from (c) to (e) implies a gain on precision but also a variation on the meaning
of the ‘forestland’. In an extreme scenario, a single tree could constitute ‘forestland’, which
could be misleading. Finally, uniformity issues can arise when the density is concentrated in
clusters (d) instead of being evenly distributed across the piece of land (e). This could lead
to the confusion of open forests with small and isolated clusters of trees in grasslands.
While any of the previous observations challenges the application of these techniques,
they highlight the level of uncertainty of the produced information and inform of the need
for the specification of the admissible scale and uniformity requirements for the classification
to be meaningful under a certain precisification. A more detailed account of the ontological
issues involved on the mapping of land cover is provided in [10].
5.3 Individuation
The notion of individuality is fundamental in the study of ontology and essential when adopting
an object model. However, formally characterising the full criteria for the individuation
of particular classes of object tends to be extremely hard [23] and is not addressed in the
majority of actual ontologies. Studies in Cognitive Science show that humans identify and
individuate objects using at least three sources of information: spatiotemporal information,
property (featural) information, and sortal information [40]. Moreover, among them, spatial
features such as shape are typically more salient than other properties [40].
Within the philosophical literature it is considered that individuation requires both
identity and unity, where the former is related to the problem of distinguishing a specific
instance of a certain class from other instances (by means of a characteristic property
unique to that object) and the latter is related to the problem of distinguishing the parts or
constituents of an instance from the rest of the world, which are bound together creating a
whole. We now propose a particular form of existence condition to axiomatically specify the
domain of individuals that are instances of a given concept.
Existence conditions differ from classification in that the latter express the necessary and
sufficient conditions for an object to be an instance of a class while the former explicitly
specify the necessary and sufficient conditions to infer the existence of an object. Below is a
constructive existential axiom that specifies that whenever a set of conditions Φ(x1, ... , xn) are
satisfied for some original concepts x1, ... , xn, then an object of kind K exists and a relation
holds between the original group and the existent object Ψ(x1, ..., xn, y).
∀x1...∀xn[Φ(x1, ... , xn) → ∃y[K(y) ∧ Ψ(x1, ... , xn, y)]]
∀y[K(y) → ∃x1...∃xn[Φ(x1, ... , xn) ∧ Ψ(x1, ... , xn, y)]]
The identity criteria I of a concept determine the conditions under which it can be
established that two references refer to the same object, that is, the characteristics that are
unique to a single specific instance [22].
∀x∀y[(K(x) ∧ K(y)) → (Ik(x, y) ↔ (x = y))]
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Finally, the notion of unity refers to the problem of describing the parts of objects and
the specific conditions (UC) under which the object constitutes a whole. A general axiomatic
characterisation of this, in terms of a unifying relation among the parts of a whole is given in
[23]. In modelling a particular domain or type of object, it is likely that more specific unity
criteria will be required. For instance, a forest may be regarded as a spatially connected
region of forested land, which is of maximal extent (i.e. is not part of a larger spatially
connected forested region). Thus, assuming a predicate Forested has been defined and applied
to all parcels of forestland, then the following axiom (where P is the parthood relation and
SCON is the property of being spatially self connected) captures a unity condition for a
possible precisification of forest:
Forest(x) → Forested(x) ∧ SCON(x) ∧ ¬∃y[P(x, y) ∧ ¬(x = y) ∧ Forested(y) ∧ SCON(y)]
Another approach to the unity of forests becomes available if we have forest detailed
information at the level of the location of individual trees. We can then define a forest as a
maximal collection of proximal trees, parameterised by some threshold of proximity. This is
the approach taken in our prototype software implementation, which will be described in
Section 6.
A variety of situations can hinder the specification of a criteria for identity and unity.
Some of them are drastic evolutions of objects through time, situations in which objects
merge or split and objects whose boundaries are ill defined or affected by sorites vagueness
thus creating confusion about self-connectedness and parthood.
Underlying axiomatisations of the space and mereotopology are key to provide appropriate
notions of parthood. In some cases, a set theoretical view where two sets are the same if and
only if they have exactly the same elements is appropriated to model the space. However,
for most objects a looser identity criteria that allows one to accept the continued existence
of an object even after the loss of certain sorts of parts is necessary.
5.3.1 Individuation of geographical objects
The consideration of the individuation of forests entangles in the extensive bibliography
about the ontology of geographical features, their characterisation and their boundaries.
Difficulties tend to arise both regarding the unification of geographical features (e.g. deciding
whether something is part or not of a forest) and their indentity (e.g. deciding whether a
forest now is the same forest as one that existed 100 years ago) particularly if there have
been substantial changes in vegetation or location [4]. Moreover, while most of the objects in
the physical world have a bona fide boundary that acts as one of the main marks of their
individuality, geographical boundaries are often fuzzy or otherwise indeterminate [8], which
makes the individuation even more challenging and the demarcation of most geographical
objects non trivial.
It may seem that a demarcation is required in order to individuate a feature such as a
forest. However, this is not necessarily the case. We show how individuation is possible
without committing to a specific boundary, particularly in cases in which we don’t encounter
borderline cases. We first describe the example of mountain, widely used in the literature,
to show how individuation and demarcation are not necessarily related. We then analyse
the case of forest and discuss how in certain cases it may be appropriate to use different
thresholds for the same parameters in the different modes of predication. Although mountain
and forest involve very different attributes, the two cases are analogous in that individuation
can be achieved prior to demarcation, and, if needed, a demarcation can subsequently be
obtained by further precisification.
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 2 Mountain individuation and demarcation. Each individual is shown with a gradient of
different colours, where the colour on the peak (orange and green) are the ones characterising the
object and used in the demarcated images (d), (e) and (f).
In a prototypical case of mountain individuation, the main characterisation for both
the existence and the individuation can be done in terms of the peak and a minimum
prominence3. Thus, in Figure 2 we see (a) a landscape in which we can identify, depending on
the precisification, (b) one or (c) two mountains. In (b) the minimum prominence required
is not satisfied and thus the whole ensemble is assumed to be a single mountain, and the
contrary occurs in (c). It is not until (d), (e) and (f) that we specify a demarcation strategy.
(d) and (e) apply the same demarcation strategy to the two different individuations (b) and
(c), and an alternative demarcation for (c) is shown in (f). The identity criteria for the
mountain is to share the highest point, that is, the peak. In terms of unity, mountain can
be characterised as a self-connected whole extending from the peak to whichever precise
boundary.
The identification of forest without relaying on the demarcation is harder because the
most salient features are its shape, size and parts. However, as we can see in Figure 3 different
looser metrics can be established, in that case nearness between the members, to detect rough
shape, location, size and fragments. Different nearness thresholds and minimal size criteria
determine the individuation of two forests in Figure 3(a) and three forests in Figure 3(b). In
addition, different precisifications of tree are used in Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b), implying
that in the former some elements are not considered members of the collective. The actual
strategy for the demarcation (green shade connecting the trees) is not done until a later
stage and depends on the selection of a suitable footprint strategy. In the figure, different
thresholds for the demarcation are shown in different tones of green. Finally, it must be
noted that it is not necessary to analyse forest in terms of a collective of trees in order to
be able to individuate it. A similar approach to the one in mountains could be done for
forests by interpolating a field of canopy cover in which similar measures to the ones used in
Figure 2 can be used.
Although identity is likely to be characterised mainly through the rough location of the
3 characterizes the height of a mountain or hill’s summit by the vertical distance between it and the lowest
contour line encircling it but containing no higher summit within it. It is a measure of the independence
of a summit.
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object, both identity and unity criteria are less intuitive for forest than for mountain, and are
expected to vary between precisifications according to the particular management objectives.
Thus, whether forest must be self-connected or not and whether it must comply with either
morphological or metrical restrictions must be made explicit for all the precisifications that
attempt to refer to forests as individuals.
5.4 Demarcation
Finally, by demarcation we mean the act of determining the spatial extension of an object,
or equivalently of establishing its boundary. Once this extension/boundary is established, it
may be referred to as ‘the demarcation’ of the object; or, in cases where the boundary is
unclear or debatable, it may be regarded as one of many possible demarcations of the object.
Establishing an object’s demarcation may be straightforward or extremely problematic.
Moreover, although this may be because of the characteristics of the particular object under
consideration, it is usually strongly related to the ontological category of object. For example,
physical artifacts (e.g. cups, tables) are typically easily demarcated because they consist
of solid matter forming an integral whole that is not physically connected to any other
matter. Even with artifacts, the demarcation may not be completely clear. For example,
some tables have a glass top that just rests on the wood below. It is debatable whether the
glass is actually part of the table. For aggregate objects, such as a school of fish, or indeed
a forest, demarcation is very often problematic, both because it may not be clear which
entities should be counted as constituents and because there is no unique way to determine
the spatial extension of something that is made up of many disconnected constituents (e.g.,
in demarcating a forest, one may want to include the space that lies between the trees within
the demarcation of the forest, as can be seen in Figure 3). Distinguished regions within field
like objects, which are again common in geography (e.g. soil type regions) also give rise to
significant demarcation problems [30].
Although the study of suitable algorithms for the demarcation go beyond the scope of
this paper, it must be noted that, in most of the studies, the specification of these strategies
are often reduced to a set of thresholds [14, 24]. In some cases, particularly in human drawn
maps, it has even been guided by intuitive and aesthetic judgements. We consider that
a more careful analysis and specification of the algorithms used can be important for an
appropriate characterisation of forests. For instance, a survey on the strategies that can be
used to demarcate the forests identified in Figure 3 can be found in [11].
5.5 Interactions among classification, individuation and demarcation
We do not see classification, individuation and demarcation as cleanly separable aspects
of a predicate’s semantics. As we have seen, a reasonable classification often presupposes
an appropriate individuation. Individuation of an object typically goes some way towards
determining its demarcation; and conversely by demarcating objects we usually also indi-
viduate them. Consequently, these different aspects may coexist within a definition and be
entangled among different terms within an ontology. This may result in a complex albeit
comprehensive ontology. But if one does not pay some attention to ensuring that all aspects
are accounted for, they may be omitted. As we have seen, it is typically classification that
receives the focus of attention, whereas individuation is taken for granted.
From a purely logical point of view, the difference between individuation and classification
is also not entirely clear cut. This is because we often have choices as to what we take to be
the universe of quantification. What is considered to be an individuating criterion in one
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choice of universe could be considered as a classification criterion applied to a larger universe
of entities from which we want to select a significant subset.
(a) (b)
Figure 3 Forest individuation and demarcation.
6 Implementation of a Supervaluationistic Geographic Query System
We have implemented in Prolog a prototype system for individuating, demarcating and
classifying forest regions. The system interprets a set of spatially located plant objects
in terms of a precisification specification of the form 〈Θ(tree), Γ(ν), σ〉, where Θ(tree) is a
classification of tree objects in terms of more basic properties (e.g. species, height), Γ(ν) is a
tree grouping algorithm parametrised by a nearness threshold ν, and σ gives the minimum
number of trees for a tree group to be considered as a forest region.
The images in Figure 3 were generated by this system and illustrate how altering the
threshold for ‘nearness’ used in an aggregation algorithm and the classification criteria of
constituents affect individuation and demarcation of aggregates. The mid green region
indicates the grouping obtained using the nearness threshold, ν, that has been applied in
grouping and determines the number of tree groups counted. (We may regard the tree
groups as ‘forests’, although to keep the computation simple and the images clear, we are
individuating much smaller groups of trees than would normally be considered to be forests.)
The light green area is computed with a nearness threshold 2ν, which incorporates all trees
into one group, and the dark area with ν/3 shrinks the tree group demarcations to include
only the more dense areas. In visualisation (a) the small brown circles (thorn bushes) are
not counted as forest constituents according to the chosen version of Θ(tree). Hence, we get
a split between forest region 1 and forest region 2. In visualisation (b), using an alternative
theory Θ′(tree), thorn bushes are treated as forest constituents, so regions 1 and 2 become
merged. Also, the minimum number of trees required to count as a forest region, σ, has
been increased in the (b) precisification. Because of this, the group counted as 3 in (a) is no
longer considered to be a forest region in (b).
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7 Conclusions
We have discussed several challenging problems that obstruct the task of giving precise
definitions of geographic terms, such as ‘forest’. To address these challenges we have provided
a framework within which one can specify a range of possible interpretations of the ‘forest’,
and which makes explicit how the semantic aspects of classification, individuation and
demarcation interact and combine within possible definitions. We have indicated how this
variability can be modelled within an ontological theory augmented with supervaluation
semantics incorporating explicit specification of precisifications. The proposed framework
has been implemented within a prototype Prolog-based GIS. In future work we intend to
give a fully formalised theory, which will form an ontology module within our system or
could equally be used within a different (non-Prolog) implementation based on the same
general principles. Because of its generality and flexibility, this framework could be applied
to characterising a wide range of geographic and other spatial objects, even where significant
vagueness and ambiguity is present and where complex individuation and demarcation criteria
may be required.
Since spatial properties and relationships often play an essential role in specifying in-
dividuation and demarcation criteria, we believe that theoretical study of these aspects
of predicate semantics will play a key role in establishing more comprehensive and robust
ontologies of geographic and other spatially related terminology. Moreover, the development
of foundational spatial information theory, which unites both geometrical and cognitive
aspects of space, will play a key role in addressing this challenge.
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